The effects of time delay in reciprocity games by Neo, Wei Siong et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2013
The effects of time delay in reciprocity games
Neoa, Wei Siong; Yua, Michael; Weber, Roberto A; Gonzaleza, Cleotilde
Abstract: Reciprocity is common in economic and social domains, and it has been widely documented
in the laboratory. While positive and negative reciprocity are observed in investment and ultimatum
games, respectively, prior laboratory studies often neglect the effect of time delays that are common in
real-world interactions. This research investigates the effect of time delays on reciprocity in the investment
and ultimatum games. We manipulate the time delay after second movers have been informed about the
first movers’ decisions. We find that a delay is correlated with fewer rejections in the ultimatum game, but
we find no effect of delays in the investment game. A follow-up study explores some of the processes that
occur during time delay in the ultimatum game. We find delays correlated to increased reported feelings
of satisfaction and decreased reported feelings of disappointment. Increased satisfaction is correlated
to an increased probability of rejection, while disappointment has a more complex relationship to the
probability of rejection.
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.001
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-73679
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Neoa, Wei Siong; Yua, Michael; Weber, Roberto A; Gonzaleza, Cleotilde (2013). The effects of time delay
in reciprocity games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34:20-35. DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.001
*Title page with author details 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
The Effects of Time Delay in Reciprocity Games 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Wei Siong Neo1, Michael Yu1, Roberto A. Weber2, Cleotilde Gonzalez1 
	  
1Department of Social and Decision Sciences 
Carnegie Mellon University 
 
2Department of Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
August 13, 2012 
  
 
	  
	  
Corresponding Author: Cleotilde Gonzalez, coty@cmu.edu 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Abstract 
 Reciprocity is common in economic and social domains, and it has been widely 
documented in the laboratory. While positive and negative reciprocity are observed in 
investment and ultimatum games, respectively, prior laboratory studies often neglect the effect of 
time delays that are common in real-world interactions. This research investigates the effect of 
time delays on reciprocity in the investment and ultimatum games. We manipulate the time delay 
after second movers have been informed about the first movers’ decisions. We find that a delay 
is correlated with fewer rejections in the ultimatum game, but we find no effect of delays in the 
investment game. A follow-up study explores some of the processes that occur during time delay 
in the ultimatum game. We find delays correlated to increased reported feelings of satisfaction 
and decreased reported feelings of disappointment.  Increased satisfaction is correlated to an 
increased probability of rejection, while disappointment has a more complex relationship to the 
probability of rejection. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, many studies have found evidence of behaviors consistent with 
reciprocity – the act of responding to perceived kindness with kindness and perceived 
unkindness with retaliation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad, 2007). 
Economists have studied its role in sustaining social norms, enforcing incomplete contracts, and 
producing downward wage rigidity (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). In the field, psychologists found that 
a waitress with a broad smile receives greater tips (Tidd & Lockard, 1978), while economists 
have found that kind acts are rewarded in the context of charitable donations (Falk, 2007). Both 
economists and psychologists have also found negative reciprocity, for example, in the context 
of wage cuts (Greenberg, 1990; Kube, Marechal & Puppe, 2010). Several theoretical models 
complement these investigations (e.g., Cox et al., 2007; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006). These models capture the idea of reciprocity and predict behavior 
consistent with observations in these experiments. 
 In the laboratory, the investment game (IG) is often used to study positive reciprocity.  
The first move, known as the sender, chooses how much money to give to the second mover, 
known as the receiver. Any money sent is increased by the experimenter.  The responder then 
decides whether to return any money to the sender.  Backward induction predicts that the 
responder will return nothing and thus the sender should send nothing. However, numerous 
studies show that most responders provide positive returns after reciving positive transfers from 
senders (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995). 
 The ultimatum game (UG) is often used to study negative reciprocity. The first mover, 
known as the proposer, offers a division of money between herself and the second mover, known 
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as the responder. The responder either accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts, the 
money is split according to the proposal; if the responder rejects, the proposer and the responder 
both receive nothing. Backward induction predicts that the responder should accept any positive 
offer and thus the proposer should offer the smallest possible positive amount. However, 
numerous studies demonstrate that most proposers offer 25% to 50% of the money, and that 
responders reject proposals half of the time when the offers are less than 20% of the money 
being divided (see Camerer, 2003, for a review). 
 In this paper, we explore one aspect often found in the field, but not in the laboratory, 
time delay. We study its effects by varying whether the responders’ decisions in the IG and UG 
are made either immediately after finding out the first movers’ decisions or waiting until after 
finding out the first movers’ decision before making their own. We address several questions 
relating to the influence of time delay and reciprocity. First, does time delay have any effect on 
second movers’ strategic behavior in the IG and UG? Second, do first movers anticipate potential 
effects of time delay and adapt their strategic behavior accordingly? Finally, what processes 
during the time delay cause these effects?  These questions are answered in three experiments. In 
Section 2, we briefly summarize the related literature. Section 3 describes how time delay may 
affect reciprocity and explains our predictions. In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we present the design, 
procedures, and results of our IG and UG experiments. Section 7 discusses our empirical 
findings, highlights some future research directions, and concludes. 
2. Time delay in reciprocity games 
 To the best of our knowledge, only three studies have empirically examined time delay in 
reciprocity games. First, Bosman, Sonnemans, and Zeelenberg (2001) conjectured that time 
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delay would lead responders in the UG to experience less intense negative emotions when 
making their decisions, which would be reflected in a lower rejection rate. In both baseline and 
“cool-off” treatments, proposers suggested how to divide 20 Dutch guilders; responders in the 
former treatment decided whether to accept or reject their offers immediately after being 
informed, whereas responders in the latter treatment decided whether to accept or reject their 
offers an hour after being informed. In the basic treatment, 3 out of 16 offers (18.8%) were 
rejected; in the cool-off treatment, 2 out of 22 offers (9.1%) were rejected. When analyses were 
restricted to low offers, i.e., offers of less than half the money), 3 out of 10 offers (30.0%) were 
rejected; in the cool-off treatment, 2 out of 19 (10.5%) were rejected. Although it was in the 
hypothesized direction, the decreased rejection rate in the cool-off treatment was not statistically 
significant, regardless of the types of offers considered. This led the authors to conclude that 
time delay had no significant effect on the responders’ behavior in the UG. 
 Second, Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2008) predicted that time delay would result in 
a lower rejection rate in the UG. In the cash (lottery) treatment, proposers suggested how to 
divide 10 euros (lottery tickets – each with an equal probability of winning 500 euros); they 
could either offer 5 euros (tickets) or 2 euros (tickets) to responders. In both cash and lottery 
treatments, responders decided whether to accept or reject their offers immediately after being 
informed about them. After making their decisions, however, responders were notified that they 
would have an opportunity to revise their initial decisions. Twenty-four hours later, responders 
made their final decisions to accept or reject their offers. In the cash treatment, 45 out of 300 
offers (15.0%) were initially rejected and 40 offers (13.3%) were rejected 24 hours later; in the 
lottery treatment, 36 out of 325 offers (11.1%) were initially rejected and 25 offers (7.7%) were 
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rejected 24 hours later. When analyses were restricted to low offers (offers of 2 euros), in the 
cash treatment, 40 out of 94 offers (42.55%) were initially rejected and 37 (39.4%) were rejected 
24 hours later; in the lottery treatment, 31 out of 112 offers (27.7%) were initially rejected and 
23 (20.5%) were rejected 24 hours later. When analyses were restricted to the 2 euros (tickets) 
offers, time delay was correlated with significantly fewer rejections for the lottery treatment, but 
not for the cash treatment. This led the authors to conclude that time delay had no significant 
effect on the responders’ behavior in the UG if low stakes were involved. 
 Third, Grimm and Mengel (2011) separated two methodological features from Oechssler 
et al.'s (2008) study: time delay and initial decisions. Proposers decided how to divide 10 Euros 
and the proposal was presented immediately to the responders. In the no delay treatment, 
responders could respond immediately to the proposal and then completed an approximately 10 
minute questionnaire; in the delay treatment with no initial response, responders observed the 
proposal, completed the questionnaire, then decided whether to accept or reject; in the delay 
treatment with an initial response, responders observed the proposal, decided whether to accept 
or reject, completed the questionnaire, then decided whether to revise their decision. When 
restricted to very low offers (1 or 2 Euros), the authors find a significant difference between the 
no delay and the delay with no initial response treatments, but not between no delay and delay 
with an initial response; although aggregated statistics across all types of offers are not available. 
2.1. Contributions of our study 
 Our first two experiment can be distinguished from the above three studies in two ways.  
First, while the previous studies focused only on negative reciprocity in the UG, our study uses 
two reciprocity games to test whether time delay has an effect on both positive and negative 
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reciprocity. Second, while the effect of time delay on proposers’ behaviors was not explicitly 
examined, our experiments are designed such that all participants are aware of the time delay so 
that changes in the first movers’ behaviors can also be studied. 
 Additionally, given conflicting results from the previous three studies, our experiments 
hope to contribute to a more complete understanding regarding whether or not time delays have 
an effect on the UG. In particular, we suggest that the non-significant but directionally consistent 
findings of Bosman et al. (2001) and Oechssler et al. (2008) should not be over-interpreted. 
Bosman et al.’s (2001) study was limited by a small sample size and included rejection rates 
close to zero, over which tests for differences in binary outcomes are weak. With the Oechssler 
et al. (2008) study, we suggest that its directionally consistent results not be so quickly dismissed 
given the other studies discussed whose results are also directionally consistent. Our study 
questions whether these findings will still persist in replication and once one corrects for low 
power. First, we employ the IG, where we can test the proportion of money returned by 
responders rather than a binary outcome. Second, we employ a variant of the UG with 
asymmetric payoffs, where the rejection rate is closer to 50% and where tests of binary outcomes 
have more power. Finally, our last experiment extends the work of the first two experiments, by 
looking more closely at the processes underlying time delay effects, focusing on measuring the 
degree to which reflective processing and emotions contribute to the potential effects of time 
delays. 
3. Predictions 
 There are at least three ways in which time delay may influence reciprocity: (1) declining 
intensity of emotions, (2) increasing loss aversion, and (3) enhancing reflective processing.  
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3.1. Emotions 
 Cox et al. (2007) include an explicit emotional state parameter in their model of 
reciprocity, suggesting that emotional states directly affect choice.  In the IG, fMRI research has 
tied reward processing to benevolent sender’s decisions in the IG (King Casas et al., 2005).  In 
the UG, rejections are commonly believed to be caused by negative emotions, such as anger 
(Pillutla & Murnigham, 1996), which is supported by fMRI research that finds greater activation 
in areas linked to processing anger and disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003).  
Psychologists and economists have treated affective states as transitory (Forgas, 1991), 
and have found them to be subject to adaptation (Frederick & Loewenstein,1999). After a time 
delay, responders may experience weaker emotions when making their decisions in the IG and 
UG, respectively, thus reducing reciprocal behavior. However, Frijda argues that repetition, not 
the passage of time, leads to reduced affective intensity (1988). As such, emotions felt at the time 
of the original offer may resurface, sustaining the reciprocal behavior. 
3.2. Loss aversion 
 Loss aversion refers to the phenomenon where the loss of a fixed amount relative to a 
reference point is seen as qualitatively larger than gaining a similar amount (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). This has been used to explain the endowment effect, where an individual places 
a higher value on an object he/she owns compared to an identical object he/she does not own 
(Thaler, 1980). Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990) presented compelling evidence for an 
instant endowment effect where object valuation was increased substantially upon possession 
and subsequent research has found that this valuation may increase over time (Strahilevitz & 
Loewenstein, 1998). 
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 When responders receive an offer in the IG or are initially given money in the UG, they 
may see themselves as possessing that money. As time passes, their valuation of this money may 
increase, reducing reciprocal behavior. 
3.3. Reflective processing 
 Dual-processing accounts of human behavior (see Evans, 2008 for a review) suggest that 
choice is determined by two distinct processing systems, which can account for economic 
behavior (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005). “System 1” involves automatic and intuitive 
processes that proceed relatively rapidly, whereas “System 2” involves controlled and reflective 
processes that proceed relatively slowly (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). Notably “System 1” is associated not only with emotions (Epstein, 
1994), but other forms of intuitive processing, such as heuristic reasoning. 
 Time delays should allow greater time for System 2 processing, thus leading to more 
economically rational decisions and reduced reciprocity. Previous research has looked at this 
aspect of reciprocity. Rubinstein (2008) found no differences in response times for accepting or 
rejecting UG offers, suggesting no differences in processing. However, this may have been 
confounded by individual differences. Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2008) imposed exogenous 
time constraints, limiting System 2 processing, and found that participants under high time 
pressure (30s to respond) were more likely to reject offers than those under low time pressure 
(180s to respond). 
3.4 Predictions 
 Overall, we expect that second movers, as a consequence of time delay, may experience 
weaker emotions, will be under the influence of stronger loss aversion, and will engage in more 
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reflective processing. In the IG (UG), we expect that positive (negative) emotions triggered by 
trusting behavior (low offers) will diminish, attachment to the money sent (offered) will increase, 
and more reflective decisions that are likely to yield the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium will 
be more likely. This translates to a lower proportion of money being returned (reduced likelihood 
of offers being rejected) by those responders who are making decisions after a time delay. We 
consider predictions for the two games separately, to account for the possibility that some of the 
mechanisms influencing IG would be different from those influencing UG. 
Hypothesis 1: In the presence of time delay, while holding constant the first mover’s 
behavior, a responder will return a lower proportion of money and will be less likely to 
reject offers in the IG and UG, respectively. 
 The above prediction concerns the effect of time delay on second movers’ behavior. How 
does time delay influence first movers’ behavior? It is critical to recognize that in contrast to 
second movers, time delay does not have an experiential aspect for first movers. Rather, a first 
mover’s behavior is affected to the degree that she strategically contemplates whether and how 
time delay will influence second movers’ behavior and make adjustments accordingly. In the IG 
(UG), we expect that senders (proposers), who are aware that responders are making decisions 
after a time delay, will send (offer) less money in response to their expectation that those 
responders will return a lower proportion of money (are less likely to reject offers).  
Hypothesis 2. When a time delay is involved, senders will send less money and proposers 
will offer less money in the IG and UG, respectively. 
4. Experiment 1: Positive reciprocity in the investment game (IG) 
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 The IG, often referred to as the “trust game,” was first studied experimentally by Berg et 
al. (1995), and Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters (1995), while a similar game was studied 
earlier by Camerer and Weigelt (1988). It is a two-player, sequential game that consists of two 
stages. One player is designated as the sender and the other player as the responder. The specific 
parameters that we adopted for our IG are described below. 
 At the beginning of the game, the sender and the responder were each endowed with $5. 
In the first stage, the sender chose an integer amount S in [0, 5] to send to the responder. Any 
positive amount S was tripled by the experimenter so that the responder received the amount 3S. 
In the second stage, the responder decided an integer amount R in [0, 5 + 3S] to return to the 
sender. Thereafter, the game concluded and the final payoffs of the sender and the responder 
were $(5 – S + R) and $(5 + 3S – R), respectively. The traditional game theoretic prediction 
entails that S = R = 0. 
4.1. Experimental Design 
 Our design included two treatments (Immediate and Delay) that differed in terms of when 
responders selected how much money to return to their senders. The Immediate treatment 
corresponds to how the IG is typically implemented in the laboratory. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, general and game instructions were read aloud by an 
experimenter and simultaneously presented on personal computers in individual cubicles. The 
entire experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Participants were randomly assigned to be senders or responders in the IG described above, and 
each sender was randomly and anonymously paired with a responder. It was emphasized that all 
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participants would remain anonymous throughout the experiment and that the experiment 
involved a one-shot game. 
 In the Immediate treatment, the sender decided the integer amount S to send. The 
responder was immediately informed of S and 3S, and decided the integer amount R to 
immediately return. The sender was immediately informed of R. Individual earnings from the 
game were revealed, indicating that the game had concluded. Thereafter, subjects were provided 
with 15 minutes of free time. Within the 15-minute period, participants were restricted from 
communicating or using any communication devices, but were otherwise not restricted in 
activity. When 15 minutes had elapsed, participants completed a questionnaire prior to the 
conclusion of the experiment. 
 In the Delay treatment, the sender decided the integer amount S to send. The responder 
was immediately informed of S and 3S, but as explained before the game began, would make his 
or her decision after a time delay. Thereafter, both movers were provided with 15 minutes of free 
time, as described above. After 15 minutes had elapsed, participants continued with the second 
stage of the IG. The responder decided the integer amount R to return. The sender was 
immediately informed of R. Individual earnings from the game were revealed, indicating that the 
game had concluded. Participants then continued to the questionnaire. 
 Two aspects of our design warrant further mention. First, we provided participants in the 
Immediate treatment with 15 minutes of free time, even though that was not absolutely necessary; 
participants could have continued to the questionnaire immediately after playing the IG. This 
alternative design, however, implies that participants in the Immediate treatment will spend less 
time in the experiment and thus receive their earnings earlier. Our design, therefore, reduces 
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potential concerns that may interfere with interpreting the contrasting behavior between the 
treatments.  
 Second, our time delay is rather short, and takes place entirely in the laboratory. In real-
world interactions, several days or weeks may transpire and economic players may do many 
varied things during that time interval. However, our design is motivated by a desire to prevent 
communication between participants, which is difficult to do outside the laboratory. Given our 
very short and simple time delay manipulation, one might consider our results as offering the 
lower bound on the potential influences of lengthier and more natural time delays. 
 Participants were mainly students from Carnegie Mellon University and the University of 
Pittsburgh. A total of 66 individuals participated in the experiment: 17 and 16 pairs in the 
Immediate and Delay treatments, respectively. We conducted a total of four sessions, two for 
each treatment, and the number of pairs in a session ranged from seven to nine.  
 Participants received a show-up payment of $5. In addition to their earnings in the IG, 
they also earned an additional $2 for answering the demographics questions and a few 
questionnaires. All participants completed the experiment within an hour and earned, on average, 
$14.52. 
4.2. Results 
 Figures 1A and 1B depict the decisions of both senders and responders in the Immediate 
and Delay treatments, respectively. The data were first sorted by the amount sent by senders in 
increasing order, followed by the amount returned by responders in increasing order. The 
amounts sent, received, and returned are represented by open circles, vertical bars, and filled 
circles, respectively. This presentation of the data from the IG follows Berg et al.'s (1995) 
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example. As the figures show, the amounts sent and returned in both Immediate and Delay 
treatments varied considerably, but there appear to be no substantive differences between the two 
treatments. 
 Table 1 provides the summary statistics that allow a direct comparison between 
treatments, as well as information on participant demographics and the activities the participants 
reported doing (yes or no) during the 15 minute delay. On average, senders sent slightly more in 
the Delay treatment ($2.63) than in the Immediate treatment ($2.41), but this did not differ 
significantly. On average, responders returned similar amounts without ($1.76) and with ($1.81) 
time delay. The proportion of money returned by responders is defined as the amount returned 
divided by the amount received (i.e., R/3S); this statistic is indeterminate for the six responders 
whose senders sent nothing. From Table 1, the mean proportions of money returned in both 
treatments were nearly identical (0.24 and 0.23 in the Immediate and Delay treatments 
respectively), providing further evidence that the responders’ behavior was not influenced by 
time delay.  
 Table 2 reports the OLS regressions of the amount sent (Model 1) and the amount 
returned by responders (Models 2 and 3). For the latter two models, only those cases in which 
the sender sent a positive amount were used. Model 1 confirms that there was no treatment effect 
on the senders’ behavior. In Models 2 and 3, the amount returned is increasing in the amount 
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received, which provides evidence of reciprocity.1 But the Delay treatment has no effect on the 
amount returned.2 
 These low proportions of money returned implied that senders, on average, were 
suffering monetary losses. Table 1 shows that senders in the Immediate and Delay treatments 
earned $4.35 and $4.19 respectively, which is less than what they would have earned if they 
simply pocketed their $5 endowment at the beginning of the game. On the other hand, 
responders in the Immediate and Delay treatments earned $10.47 and $11.06 respectively, which 
included their $5 endowment at the beginning of the game. The amounts earned by the two roles 
did not differ significantly by treatment.3 
4.3. Discussion 
 Contrary to our hypotheses, we find no effect of a time delay on behavior in the IG. The 
amounts sent by responders and the subsequent proportions returned are almost identical 
between the two treatments. The null result suggests that time delay – at least as implemented in 
this experiment – does not yield the hypothesized behavioral effects. Before drawing this 
conclusion, however, we explore behavior in the ultimatum game. 
5. Experiment 2: Negative reciprocity in the ultimatum game (UG) 
                                                          
 
 
1 An alternative interpretation is that responders are simply able to return more money when they receive more. 
However, Figure 1 reveals that none of the responders used in the regressions in Table 2 returned the maximum 
amount to the sender. 
2 We do not include an interaction term between amount received and Delay treatment because of the high 
collinearity between the interaction and the Delay treatment variable (the correlation is 0.76). Including the 
interaction term does not substantively change the results. Replacing Delay treatment with the interaction term also 
does not change the results. 
3 We found no significant relationship between the CRT and ZTPI questionnaire scores and subject behavior.  
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 The UG was first studied experimentally by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982). 
It is a two-player, sequential game that consists of two stages. One player is designated the 
proposer and the other player is designated the responder. Our specific implementation of the 
game involved asymmetric values for the good being divided. The specific parameters that we 
adopted are described below. 
 Our choice of a UG with asymmetric values was intended to circumvent the 
aforementioned power concerns in previous studies (Bosman et al., 2001; Oechssler et al., 2008). 
Recall that rejection rates in the baseline (no delay) conditions of these prior studies were quite 
low, potentially making it difficult to detect the effects of time delay, particularly if they are 
likely to reduce the rejection rate as hypothesized. Our design achieves a higher baseline 
rejection rate by introducing asymmetric values for the proposer and the responder. The UG used 
here is primarily informed by the experiment conducted by Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996). 
 Kagel et al. (1996) varied both information and payoff structures to gain insight into the 
nature of fairness considerations in the UG. Of particular interest is the treatment where the 
proposer and the responder bargained over 100 chips and both had common knowledge that each 
chip was worth $0.30 and $0.10 to the proposer and the responder, respectively. Under such 
asymmetry, proposers and responders might be motivated by self-serving notions of fairness 
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).4 Participants played that UG 
                                                          
 
 
4 In this asymmetric UG, proposers benefit if fairness is interpreted as an equal division of chips rather than an equal 
division of money, while responders favor the alternative interpretation. Under an equal division of chips, the 
proposer receives 50 chips valued at $15 and the responder receives 50 chips valued at $5. Under an equal division 
of money, the proposer receives 25 chips valued at $7.50, while the responder receives equal value from 75 chips. 
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for 10 periods with perfect stranger matching. The authors reported a rejection rate of 39% 
across the 10 periods and a rejection rate of 52% for the first three periods. These rejection rates 
are much higher than that in the standard UG.5 
5.1. Experimental Design 
 The procedures were almost identical to those employed for Experiment 1, except that we 
used the asymmetric UG described below instead of the IG. The treatment variable, time delay, 
was implemented as in Experiment 1. 
 Following general instructions, participants received instructions describing the UG. The 
proposer and the responder were informed that there were 100 chips to be divided between them 
and that each chip was worth $0.15 to the proposer and $0.05 to the responder. In the first stage, 
the proposer offered an integer number of chips C in [0, 100] to the responder, thereby proposing 
to keep the remaining (100 – C) chips. In the second stage, the responder decided either to accept 
or reject the offer. If the responder accepted the offer, the proposer received (100 – C) chips 
valued at $(15 – 0.15C), and the responder received C chips valued at $0.05C; if the responder 
rejected the offer, neither the proposer nor the responder received any chips, and thus received 
no earnings. Thereafter, the game concluded. 
 A total of 86 individuals participated in the experiment: 22 and 21 pairs in the Immediate 
and Delay treatments, respectively. A total of six sessions, three for each treatment, was 
                                                          
 
 
5 A more recent study, however, found lower rejection rates with the asymmetric UG (Gneezy & Güth, 2003). In one 
of their treatments, the proposer and the responder bargained over 100 chips and both had common knowledge that 
each chip was worth $0.40 and $0.20 to the proposer and the responder respectively. Participants played that UG 
once and only 2 out of 16 offers (12.5%) were rejected. The authors suggested that the dramatically lower rejection 
rate might be attributed to the less asymmetric ratio in chip values for their treatment. 
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conducted and the number of pairs in a session ranged from six to nine. Recruitment and 
experimental procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1. We administered the same 
questionnaires from Experiment 1. Participants earned, on average, $10.54.  
5.2. Results 
 Figure 2 depicts the decisions by proposers and responders in each pair in the Immediate 
(Figure 2A) and Delay (Figure 2B) treatments of the UG. The data were first sorted by the 
number of chips offered by proposers in increasing order, followed by the responders’ decisions 
with rejections displayed first. Offers accepted and rejected are represented by white and black 
vertical bars respectively. A summary of the data, by treatment and role, is presented in Table 3. 
 The number of chips offered in both Immediate and Delay treatments varied considerably. 
Consistent with prior UG experiments and the notion of negative reciprocity, rejections typically 
occurred when the number of chips offered was relatively small. Comparing Figures 2A and 2B, 
the frequency of rejections, considering all offers, was lower in the Delay treatment (14%) than 
in the Immediate treatment (41%), suggesting that the time delay influenced the responders’ 
behavior as we predicted. The difference in the rejection frequencies is statistically significant in 
a non-parametric chi-square test (χ2(1) = 3.79, p = 0.05). 
 Despite the lower rejection rate given a time delay, proposers offered similar numbers of 
chips, on average, in the Immediate (43.50) and Delay (45.81) treatments. Thus, responders did 
not appear to adjust for the responders’ increased willingness to accept low offers given a time 
delay. This is confirmed in Model 1 of Table 4, which regresses the amount sent by proposers in 
the Delay treatment and demographic control variables, finding no significant relationships. 
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Table 4 also confirms that responders were significantly less likely to reject offers in the 
Delay treatment. Models 2 and 3 reports the marginal effects coefficients for a probit regression 
of the responders’ decisions to accept or reject. The negative coefficient for chips offered 
indicates reciprocity: responders were 1.4% less likely to reject for every additional chip offered. 
According to Model 3 and consistent with our hypothesis, responders were 30% less likely to 
reject offers in the Delay treatment.6 
 The lower rejection rates in the Delay treatment suggests that both proposers and 
responders might have earned more money, on average, than their respective counterparts in the 
Immediate treatment. Table 3 shows that proposers in the Delay treatment earned $2.39 more 
than those in the Immediate treatment, and this difference is statistically significant in a non-
parametric rank-sum test (z = 1.95, p = 0.05). Similarly, responders in the Delay condition 
earned $0.53 more, on average, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
5.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we did not find that time delay affected rejection rates in the IG; 
however, in Experiment 2, we found that time delay may lead to less rejections in the UG.  A 
potential concern regarding the exogenously imposed time delay is that second movers in the 
Delay treatment may be susceptible to demand effects. In other words, they might wonder why 
their decisions were made 15 minutes later and hence reasoned that changes to their behavior 
                                                          
 
 
6 As with Table 2, we do not include an interaction term between chips offered and Delay treatment because of the 
high collinearity between the interaction and the Delay treatment variable (the correlation is 0.87). Not surprisingly, 
including both the interaction term and the Delay treatment variable results in statistical insignificance for both 
coefficients. However, if we include only the interaction term (and not the Delay treatment variable), this coefficient 
is negative and similar in statistical significance to the Delay treatment variable in Model 3. 
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were expected. The unintended null finding in the IG guards against this criticism to some extent 
because it is reasonable to assume that demand effects should be similar for both reciprocity 
games. 
Previously, we presented three reasons why time delay might mitigate the tendency to 
behave reciprocally in the IG and UG: strengthened loss aversion/endowment effect, declining 
intensity of emotions, and reflective processing. The different effects of time delay across these 
two games provide stronger support for some of these reasons than others. 
There is little reason for supposing that loss aversion/endowment effect’s influence 
would differ between the reciprocity games. In both games, the responder should have become 
accustomed to a new reference point – possessing the offered money. As we find significant 
effects in the UG but not in the IG, we do not find strong support for loss aversion and the 
endowment effect. 
On the other hand, there is some suggestion that reflective processing may account for 
the differences. At face value, responding to an UG offer involves a more straightforward 
decision than the IG. Research in the latter has shown that altruism, inequity aversion, and 
positive reciprocity all play a significant role in the responders’ behavior (Charness & Haruvy, 
2002; Cox, 2004). Social and moral norms that differ across individuals, religions, and cultures 
have also been found to substantially influence the responders’ behavior (Camerer, 2003). This 
inherent complexity may naturally induce more reflexive processing in the no delay treatment for 
IG, but not in the UG – leading to reduced differences in the IG when time delays are enforced.  
Our use of the asymmetric UG, under which there are multiple divisions of the initial endowment 
that may be considered fair, should increase the complexity of the UG and therefore reduce 
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differences between our IG and UG experiments. Moreover, Oxoby and McLeish (2004) find no 
difference when participants are asked to consider responses to all possible offers prior to 
playing the UG (the strategy vector method) and when participants engage in the UG in the 
normal sequence; despite the greater reflexive processing imposed by the strategy vector method. 
Given these considerations, it seems that reflexive processing alone may not sufficiently explain 
our observed results. 
Lastly, we find stronger support for the role of emotions. Previous research supports the 
hypothesis that the rejections of low offers in the UG are predominantly driven by negative 
emotions (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003); however, the diverse motivations of 
the responders’ behavior in the IG just discussed may induce a less affective response. In 
addition, since senders are almost certainly sending money as a means to potentially gain more, 
some responders may not interpret transfers by senders as trusting behavior and consequently 
only experience relatively weak positive emotions, if any at all. Given the assortment of 
motivations underlying responder behavior in the IG and the less consequential role of positive 
emotions, the non-significant effect of time delay is no longer as perplexing. Moreover, the 
emotion explanation is also consistent with Oxoby and McLeish's (2004) study, if participants 
can anticipate their emotional responses to hypothetical scenarios (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 
1999; Robinson & Clore 2001). We conjecture that the negative emotions produced by receiving 
a low offer in the UG, and which regularly leads to rejection in our Immediate treatment, 
diminish when the responder is forced to delay making a choice. 
To better understand the contributions of these factors, we attempt to measure these in the 
UG in a third experiment. 
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6. Experiment 3: Processes of negative reciprocity with time delay in the ultimatum game 
(UG) 
Bosman et al. (2001) found that emotions appeared to play an important role in 
ultimatum game rejections. Specifically, negative emotions were correlated with lower offers; 
responders who expected higher offers reported more anger, irritation, and envy; and reports of 
anger, contempt, irritation, envy, and sadness were correlated with more rejections. However, 
they found no evidence of time delay affecting emotions and thus rejected emotional cooling off 
as a process that could affect ultimatum game behavior, and noted that emotions may “resurface” 
(Frijda, 1988) when responders in the time delay condition are asked to make their final decision. 
Evidence from our Experiments 1 and 2 and continued concerns about statistical power 
prompted us to rerun the analysis with several modifications. First, we wanted to recruit a 
substantially larger sample. Second, we wanted to include emotions believed to be sensitive to 
more subtle changes in emotional states. For example, we suspected a scale point difference in 
“anger” may represent a bigger change in emotional state than a scale point difference in 
“frustration,” and thus lead to reduced measurement precision and increased measurement error. 
Finally, research suggests that behavior in the ultimatum game can be affected by incidental 
emotions such as sadness (Harlé & Sanfey 2007) and disgust (Bonini et al. 2011). To control for 
these effects, we wanted to ask participants to describe both their emotions when making the 
decision, as well as emotions experienced in the week prior to the experiment. 
In addition, to measure reflective processing we asked responders to explain why they 
chose to accept or reject the offer.  We use the length of their response in the form of a word 
count to assess the responder’s reflective processing. 
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6.1. Experimental Design 
 Procedures were similar to the asymmetric UG from Experiment 2. Immediately after 
responding to the offer, we asked responders to answer an open-ended question regarding why 
they chose to accept or reject the offer. Following the open-ended question, we asked responders 
“the extent to which [they] felt the following emotions when deciding how to respond to the 
offer” and “over the past week, not including during the survey.” The emotions included: angry, 
frustrated, insulted, disappointed, happy, grateful, satisfied, confident, shocked, and surprised.  
Responses ranged from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Extremely”). 
In addition, to increase our sample size, we administered the game online through 
Amazon mTurk. This required two notable changes in our design. First, while the proposer and 
responder were informed that 100 chips were to be divided between them, as before, each chip 
was now worth $0.03 to the proposer and $0.01 to the responder. These values were selected to 
be in line with the payments commonly given on mTurk. Second, as it was more difficult to 
monitor participants online, we provided participants with an unrelated task to perform during 
the 15 minute time delay in which participants had to interpret a graph describing the rate of 
people entering and leaving a department store.  Performance in that task was not incentivized. 
 A total of 344 individuals completed the experiment: 88 and 84 pairs in the Immediate 
and Delay treatments, respectively. Recruitment was performed through Amazon mTurk. 
Participants were 53% male, had a median age of 25, and predominantly resided in the United 
States (73%) and India (22%). In addition to their earnings in the UG, participants received a 
show-up payment of $1. In total, participants earned, on average, $1.63.  
6.2. Results 
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 Figure 3 depicts the decisions by proposers and responders in each pair in the Immediate 
(Figure 3A) and Delay (Figure 3B) treatments of the UG. Offers accepted and rejected are 
represented by white and black vertical bars respectively. A summary of the data, by treatment 
and role, is presented in Table 5. Comparing Figures 3A and 3B, the frequency of rejections was 
lower in the Delay treatment (25%) than in the Immediate treatment (42%), suggesting that the 
time delay influenced the responders’ behavior as predicted. The difference in the rejection 
frequencies is statistically significant in a non-parametric chi-square test (χ2(1) = 5.59, p = 0.02). 
 In this experiment, we do see a suggestion that proposers may offer fewer chips in the 
Immediate (44.01) than in the Delay (50.00) treatments, although the significance is low. This 
difference is in the opposite direction as we had initially predicted. 
 In Models 2 and 3 of Table 5, we reproduce our findings that responders were less likely 
to reject offers in the Delay treatment, although the significance is lower than observed in 
Experiment 2. The negative coefficient for chips offered indicates reciprocity: responders were 
1.2% less likely to reject for every additional chip offered. According to Model 3 and consistent 
with our hypothesis, responders were 13% less likely to reject offers in the Delay treatment. 
 Models 4, 5, and 6 consider the contribution of emotion and reflexive processing. Model 
4 was developed using all the emotion measures and word count, which we used to measure 
reflexive processing. Model 5 and Model 6 were determined using model selection that 
minimized AIC and BIC, respectively. Word count does not appear significantly correlated in 
Model 4 and the parameter is dropped by the model selection process in Models 5 and 6. Three 
emotions appear correlated to rejections across all models: increased reports of insult and of 
confidence and decreased reports of satisfaction are correlated with increased rejection. In 
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Models 4 and 5, decreased reports of disappointment are correlated with increased rejection. 
Reports of anger and frustration do not appear to have a significant effect on rejections. The 
effect of the delay treatment becomes non-significant in Models 4 and 5, and the delay treatment 
is removed as a dependent variable in Model 6. 
 Due to multicollinearity concerns, we also tested the effect of each emotion 
independently using independent probit regressions, with only demographic and treatment 
variables as covariates, included in Table 7. We find that increased reports of anger, frustration, 
injury, and shock and decreased reports of happiness, gratefulness, and satisfaction are correlated 
to increased rejections. 
 Table 8 considers the relationship between reflective processing and emotions to our 
treatments and demographic variables. Using an OLS regression, we find that larger offers are 
correlated with decreased reports of feeling angry, frustrated, insulted, disappointed, and shocked; 
and increased reports of feeling happy, grateful, satisfied, and surprised. The delay treatment is 
correlated with decreased reports of feeling disappointed and surprised; and increased reports of 
feeling satisfied. Reported feelings of each of these emotions over the past week are shown to 
significantly influence feelings at the time of the decision. Similar findings hold when running 
the analysis using an ordered logistic model. We also find that the delay treatment is correlated 
with longer explanations in the responders’ decision. 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 In the IG, we found no significant evidence that time delay was correlated with either the 
senders’ or the responders’ behavior.  In the UG, we found evidence that time delay was 
significantly correlated to decreased rejections by responders, and mixed evidence that time 
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delay was correlated to more generous offers from the proposer.  In the UG, we further found 
that time delay was correlated to increased reported satisfaction and decreased reported 
disappointment, with reported satisfaction appearing to partially mediate the effect of the 
reduced rejection and reported disappointment playing a potentially more complex role.  In 
particular, disappointment was non-significantly correlated with increased probability of 
rejection when analyzed without other emotional covariates but with a decreased probability of 
rejection when other emotions were included.  We suspect that this arises from two different 
sources of disappointment.  The first source is from receiving a lower than expected offer and is 
captured by the other measures of emotion in our model.  The second source is from conceding 
to a lower than expected offer.  
 A post hoc consideration of satisfaction and disappointment suggests an alternative to 
how time delay affects emotions.  Both emotions are closely linked to meeting or failing to meet 
expectations. Bosman et al. (2001) found that responders who had expected higher offers 
reported more anger, irritation, and envy, which were all correlated with increased rejections of 
offers. In the time delay treatments, increased satisfaction and reduced disappointment may have 
resulted from reduced expectations. As such the reduced rejections may be attributed to a change 
in the emotional stimulus, rather than the waning of experienced emotions as suggested by 
traditional cooling off accounts. 
We find little evidence of increased loss aversion or increased reflective processing as 
contributing to reduced rejections in the IG.  For loss aversion, we would expect time delay to 
affect both the IG and UG; however, our experiments find an effect only in the UG, contrary to 
loss aversion predictions.  For reflective processing, we do find evidence of greater reflective 
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processing given a time delay in the form of longer explanations; however, longer explanations 
do not appear correlated with decreased rejections.  Thus more thought about the decision does 
not appear to lead to more economically rational behavior. 
Regarding the proposer in the UG, we found mixed evidence of the effect of time delay, 
with no significant effect in Experiment 2 and a marginally significant effect of more generous 
offers in Experiment 3.  As such, we cannot conclusively state whether or not proposers change 
their behavior when faced with a time delay.  If they do, Experiment 3 suggests that they respond 
in a way that is inconsistent with increasing their expected outcome. 
However, we must be cautious about our conclusions given that our implementation of 
the UG and IG differ in more ways than the nature of the reciprocity. For example, the 
responders’ decisions in our IG were almost continuous, whereas the responders’ decisions in 
our UG were binary.  Despite these differences, we believe that selecting variants of the UG and 
IG that are similar to previous research allows our findings to be more easily integrated and 
applied to what we currently know.  With this as a basis, a greater understanding of the 
phenomenon can be developed by further varying how they time delay and the strategic games 
are implemented.
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Table 1. Summary of means for Experiment 1 (IG) 
 
 Immediate treatment  Delay treatment 
 Sender Responder  Sender Responder 
Investment Game      
     Amount sent ($) 02.41 (1.66)   02.63 (1.67)  
     Amount returned ($)  01.76 (2.56)   01.81 (2.34) 
     Proportion returned  00.24 (0.19)a   00.23 (0.22)a 
     Earnings ($) 04.35 (2.15) 10.47 (4.16)  04.19 (2.26) 11.06 (4.58) 
Delay Activities      
 Email 0.47 0.82  0.44 0.50 
 School work 0.24 0.18  0.19 0.13 
 Drink 0.00 0.06  0.13 0.00 
 Eat 0.00 0.06  0.06 0.00 
 Listen to music 0.06 0.00  0.06 0.00 
 Plan/organize schedule 0.12 0.29  0.19 0.25 
 Recreational reading 0.06 0.24  0.06 0.06 
 School reading 0.12 0.06  0.06 0.19 
 Rest 0.24 0.06  0.13 0.38 
 Surf the internet 0.53 0.59  0.44 0.50 
 Think about the game 0.35 0.35  0.31 0.56 
 Other 0.12 0.24  0.13 0.06 
Demographics      
     Age 20.35 (2.67) 22.24 (7.48)  26.94 (15.41) 20.38 (1.86) 
     Gender (Male) 00.53 00.47  00.44 00.50 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
a This statistic was computed for responders whose senders sent a non-zero amount of money. 
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Table 2. Relationship of sender and responder behavior to treatment and demographics for 
Experiment 1 (IG) 
  
Model: OLS 
Player: Sender Responder 
Dependent variable: Amount sent Amount returned 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Amount received  0.277** 0.280* 
  (0.132) (0.136) 
    
Delay treatment -0.333  -0.160 
 (0.626)  (0.957) 
    
Age -0.017 0.256 0.255 
 (0.028) (0.226) (0.760) 
    
Gender (Male) 0.117 -0.711 -0.723 
 (0.598) (0.957) (0.980) 
    
Constant 2.689 -5.202 -5.132 
 (0.773) (4.844) (4.966) 
    
Number of observations 33 27 27 
R2 0.017 0.189 0.190 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of parameter estimates; Models 2 and 3 include 
only data from responders who received positive amounts. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, all two-tailed 
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Table 3. Summary of means for Experiment 2 (UG) 
 
 Immediate treatment  Delay treatment 
 Proposer Responder  Proposer Responder 
Ultimatum Game      
     Chips offered 43.50 (22.94)   45.81 (18.76)  
     Reject  00.41   00.14 
     Earnings ($) 04.04 (4.05) 01.61 (1.55)  06.43 (3.47) 02.14 (1.16) 
Delay Activities      
 Email 0.68 0.55  0.38 0.43 
 School work 0.05 0.18  0.05 0.19 
 Drink 0.09 0.05  0.00 0.10 
 Eat 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
 Listen to music 0.05 0.09  0.00 0.05 
 Plan/organize schedule 0.32 0.27  0.14 0.10 
 Recreational reading 0.23 0.18  0.10 0.29 
 School reading 0.05 0.18  0.19 0.10 
 Rest 0.18 0.36  0.24 0.10 
 Surf the internet 0.64 0.55  0.62 0.43 
 Think about the game 0.59 0.55  0.29 0.62 
 Other 0.14 0.09  0.14 0.10 
Demographics      
     Age 20.18 (4.27) 20.18 (2.13)  21.19 (4.37) 20.67 (3.76) 
     Male 00.45 00.50  00.43 00.29 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 4. Relationship of proposer and responder behavior to treatment, demographics for 
Experiment 2 (UG) 
 
Model: OLS Probit (marginal effects) 
Player: Proposer Responder 
Dependent variable: Chips offered Probability of rejection 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Chips offered  -0.014*** -0.014*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Delay 1.772  -0.296** 
 (6.582)  (0.143) 
    
Age 0.556 -0.014 -0.007 
 (0.818) (0.022) (0.022) 
    
Gender (Male) 0.881 -0.024 -0.102 
 (6.948) (0.141) (0.139) 
    
Constant 31.886*   
 (16.405)   
    
Number of observations 43 43 43 
Log likelihood  -17.41 -15.23 
(Pseudo) R2 0.018 0.316 0.402 
    
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of parameter estimates. When restricted to 
unequal monetary divisions (less than 75 chips offered), chips offered and delay remain 
significant.  When restricted to unequal chip divisions (less than 50 chips offered), chips offered 
is directionally consistent but not significant and delay is significant at α = 0.10. 
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, all two-tailed 
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Table 5. Summary of means for Experiment 3 (UG) 
  
 Immediate treatment  Delay treatment 
 Proposer Responder  Proposer Responder 
Ultimatum Game      
 Chips offered 44.01 (2.51)   50.00 (2.56)  
 Reject  00.42   00.25 
 Earnings ($) 01.68 (0.08) 00.44 (0.03)  01.50 (0.08) 00.50 (0.26) 
Reflective Processing      
 Word Count   16.35 (1.32)    20.33 (1.75) 
Emotions      
 Angry   2.48 (0.18)    2.26 (0.18) 
 Frustrated   2.75 (0.21)    2.63 (0.20) 
 Insulted   3.00 (0.23)    2.77 (0.21) 
 Disappointed   3.63 (0.22)    2.95 (0.22) 
 Happy   3.49 (0.21)    3.75 (0.21) 
 Grateful   3.41 (0.21)    3.51 (0.22) 
 Satisfied   3.43 (0.21)    4.18 (0.22) 
 Confident   4.19 (0.21)    4.08 (0.22) 
 Shocked   2.73 (0.21)    2.36 (0.18) 
 Surprised   3.56 (0.22)    3.11 (0.20) 
Demographics      
 Age 28.50 (1.02) 29.24 (1.19)  29.21 (1.10) 28.18 (0.95) 
 Male 00.45 0.56  00.43 00.50 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 6. Relationship of proposer and responder behavior to treatment, demographics, reflective 
processing and emotions for Experiment 3 (UG) 
 
Model: OLS Probit (marginal effects) 
Player: Proposer Responder 
Dependent 
variable: 
Chips 
offered 
Probability of rejection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Chips offered    -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.005** 
    (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
          -   Delay   6.049*    -0.127*  -0.13  -0.130   
  (3.612)    (0.075)  (0.083)  (0.083)   
             
Age  -0.143  0.000  -0.000  0.001     
  (0.184)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)     
             
Gender (Male)  0.549  -0.016  -0.027  -0.108     
  (3.618)  (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.095)     
             
Word Count        -0.003     
        (0.003)     
             
Angry        0.069     
        (0.048)     
             
Frustrated        0.001     
        (0.037)     
             Insulted        0.076*  0.089***  0.060*** 
        (0.040)  (0.034)  (0.022) 
             Disappointed        -0.085**  -0.075**   
        (0.040)  (0.037)   
             
Happy        -0.055  -0.063   
        (0.042)  (0.039)   
             
Grateful        -0.010     
        (0.034)     
             
Satisfied        -0.080**  -0.085***  -0.104*** 
        (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.028) 
             
Confident        0.076**  0.065**  0.057** 
        (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
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Shocked        -0.025     
        (0.044)     
             
Surprised        0.036  0.039   
        (0.030)  (0.025)   
             
Constant  47.829***           
  (6.151)           
       
Number of 
observations 
172 172 172 172 172 172 
Log likelihood  -86.78 -85.39 -65.57 -67.59 -72.44 
(Pseudo) R2 0.018 0.211 0.223 0.40 0.39 0.34 
AIC  1.05 1.06 0.949 0.891 0.900 
BIC  -691.22 -688.86 -671.86 -703.86 -714.75 
       
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of parameter estimates. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, all two-tailed 
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Table 7. Independent probit coefficients, relationship of probability of rejection to emotions and 
reflective processing with only treatment and demographic controls for Experiment 3 (UG) 
 
Model: Probit (marginal effects) 
Player: Responder 
Dependent Variable: Probability of rejection 
Reflective Processing  
 Word Count  -0.003  (0.003) 
Emotions  
 Angry  0.088*** (0.025) 
 Frustrated  0.058*** (0.022) 
 Insulted  0.080*** (0.021) 
 Disappointed  0.032  (0.021) 
 Happy  -0.078*** (0.022) 
 Grateful  -0.050** (0.021) 
 Satisfied  -0.081*** (0.022) 
 Confident  -0.004 (0.019) 
 Shocked  0.049*** (0.022) 
 Surprised  0.028 (0.020) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of parameter estimates. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, all two-tailed 
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Table 8. Relationship of reflective processing and emotions to study treatments and demographics for Experiment 3 (UG) 
 
Model: OLS 
Player: Responder 
Dependent 
variable: 
Word 
Count 
Angry Frustrated Insulted 
Dis-
appointed 
Happy Grateful Satisfied Confident Shocked Surprised 
Chips 
offered 
 0.011 -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.047***  -0.044*** 0.035*** 0.038***  0.041***  0.004 -0.010*(c) 0.011*(a) 
 (0.047) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
                
Delay   3.914* -0.015 0.092 0.102  -0.450* 0.171 -0.029  0.546**  -0.084 -0.319 -0.533*(a) 
  (2.226) (0.233) (0.261) (0.263)  (0.261) (0.261) (0.264)  (0.266)  (0.291) (0.270) (0.287) 
                
Age  0.042 0.006 -0.013(b) 0.105  0.002 0.015 0.008  0.006  -0.006 -0.003 0.032**(b) 
  (0.113) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
                
Gender 
(Male) 
 -0.779 0.659*** 0.532** 0.252  0.328 0.470* 0.658**  0.246  0.424 0.271 0.125 
 (2.26) (0.024) (0.265) (0.267)  (0.265) (0.264) (0.267)  (0.270)  (0.297) (0.276) (0.291) 
                
Past Week   0.136** 0.136** 0.167**  0.247*** 0.279*** 0.287***  0.224***  0.422*** 0.294*** 0.271*** 
   (0.068) (0.065) (0.075)  (0.070) (0.079) (0.074)  (0.083)  (0.087) (0.081) (0.077) 
            
Constant   2.751*** 3.743*** 4.212*** 4.612*** -0.202 -0.218 0.241 2.000 2.468 1.215 
   (0.513) (0.575) (0.571) (0.571) (0.635) (0.597) (0.606) (0.646) (0.563) (0.606) 
            
Number of 
obs. 
 
172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Adj R2  0.20 0.19 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.14 0.10 0.11 
            
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of parameter estimates.  “Past Week” refers to the reported feeling of the same 
emotions during past week.  All significance levels similar in the ordered logit, except as notated: (a) not significant under ordered logit, 
(b) p < 0.1 under ordered probit, (c) p < 0.05 under ordered probit. 
 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, all two-tailed 
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Figure 1. Amount sent, received, and returned per sender-responder pair in the (A) Immediate 
and (B) Delay treatments of the investment game. 
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Figure 2. Number of chips offered and accept/reject decision per proposer-responder pair in the 
(A) Immediate and (B) Delay treatments of the ultimatum game. 
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Figure 3. Number of chips offered and accept/reject decision per proposer-responder pair in the 
(A) Immediate and (B) Delay treatments of the ultimatum game. 
 
 
